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The evolution of  the American price  level under the Bretton Woods 
system was essentially independent of international influences. America 
was a source but scarcely a victim of inflationary trends in the rest of  the 
world. This indictment follows from the special role of the United States 
as provider of  a fiat reserve currency. This is not the role suggested by the 
“gold-exchange standard,” but it is the role the United States in fact 
appears to have pursued. 
The essential independence from foreign influences of  a fiat reserve 
country is demonstrated in section 16.1. In particular, it is shown that the 
world inflation trends are determined by the reserve country alone and 
that world  money and world  reserves adjust passively without  causal 
significance. Section 16.2 examines the evidence on the empirical ques- 
tion as to whether the United States acted as a fiat or commodity reserve 
country. Neither balance-of-payments deficits nor decreases in the gold 
stock induced any reduction in the American money supply, so the fiat 
reserve interpretation is supported. Domestic monetary policy is seen in 
section  16.3 to be  the dominant determinant of  American  inflation, 
especially over longer periods.  Other domestic and foreign influences 
have played  decidedly  minor  roles which  are trivial in  explaining in- 
flationary trends. Conclusions and implications complete the chapter. 
16.1  A Model of a Fiat-Reserve-Currency System 
This section proposes a simple model of a fiat-reserve-currency system 
as a stylized description of the Bretton Woods System. Since our primary 
concern is inflationary trends, it is assumed that we are dealing with a 
time period sufficiently long that the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments with exogenously given purchasing power parities is applica- 
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ble. As will be obvious, the essential nature of  a fiat reserve country as an 
independent exogenous source of  world inflation would not be altered by 
allowing for the nonreserve countries to affect their parities via commer- 
cial policies or to pursue partial sterilization policies. 
The reserve country is defined by the fact that other countries peg the 
exchange rates Ei between their currencies and that of  the reserve coun- 
try. The reserve country in turn is on a fiat standard and makes no effort 
to peg its exchange value relative to any commodity or other currency. 
For our purposes let the “world” consist of a currency bloc of  n countries, 
the nth of which is the reserve currency. Floating exchange rates insulate 
this world from other worlds built around other reserve currencies; so 
they can be ignored for now.  Each of  the first n -  1 countries holds 
reserves Rj in the form of  bonds issued by country n. In the long-run 
equilibrium being considered, real income yi  grows at a constant rate E. 
fixed by supply conditions, where r is the growth rate operator. 
The  model  contains  n -  1  purchasing  power  parity  conditions 
(rEj  = 0): 
(16.1)  rq=rP,,  i=i  ,...,  rt-1. 
Money demand is determined according to the Cambridge equation with 
constant trend fluidity growth 6.:’ 
(16.2) 
Money market equilibrium holds in the long run: 
(16.3)  rM?= rM;,  i = I,. . . ,  rt. 
The money multiplier in each country is assumed to grow at a constant 
rate G.  High-powered money Hi is the sum of domestic credit Dj fixed 
by the local monetary authority and reserves Rj: 
rMD= Vi+pi+  rq,  i = 1,.  . . ,  a. 
(16.4)  D.-  R.  TM: =  + ’rDj + --lTRj,  i = 1, . , . ,  n.  Hi  Hi 
Equation counting yields 4n -  1  equations to solve for the 4n endoge- 
nous variables (the Ye,  TME TMf,  and rRJ. The missing equation is 
obtained by noting that a fiat reserve currency producer has no need for 
reserves since it only exchanges one unit of  its money for another. So its 
reserves can be fixed as zero) (Hi  = Di or THi = rDJ: 
(16.5)  TR, = 0. 
-- 
1. The short-run importance of  such policies is examined at length in parts I1 and I11 of 
this volume. 
2. Fluidity (the inverse of  income velocity) is of  course a function of interest rates and 
real income as well as payments practices and institutions. As their long-run growth rates 
are unaffected, we can assume constant fluidity growth without loss of generality. 
3.  Or any other constant. 480  Chapter Sixteen 
Note the recursive structure of this model: Equations (16.2) through 
(16.4) for country n plus (16.5) completely determine the equilibrium 
values for the reserve country. Given this equilibrium value of r‘P, = 
+ TH, -  r+, -  ry,  and the  II -  1  purchasing power parity conditions, all 
the other inflation rates YP,, . . . ,  TP,-,,  are determined. This in turn 
determines the money supply growth in each nonreserve country which 
finally determines the growth in each country’s reserves given its chosen 
trend domestic credit growth. This simple recursive  structure differs 
sharply from  the world  money  supply  and demand approach, which 
builds up world real money demand and world nominal money supply 
aggregates (in  reserve currency units)  and  then  solves for the world 
inflation rate as the difference in their growth  rate^.^ The flaw in this 
approach is that even if  there is a stable multiplier between the world 
money supply on the one hand and world domestic credit plus reserves on 
the other, world-reserves growth adjusts passively so as to equate the 
world inflation rate thus determined  with the equilibrium TP,  determined 
in the reserve country. The crucial point is that nonreserve countries hold 
the reserve country’s interest-bearing bonds-not  its money-as  reserves 
and those holdings have no natural ~onstraint.~ 
The essential exogeneity of  the reserve country as a source of  world 
inflation rests on two assumptions: (1) The reserve country’s nominal 
money supply growth (rp,  + TH,)  does not respond to changes in its 
own reserves or in the reserves of  other central banks. (2) The growth- 
rate of  the reserve country’s real money demand (r+,  + ry,)  is indepen- 
dent of  foreign influences. The empirical validity of those assumptions is 
the subject of sections 16.2 and 16.3. 
--- 
16.2  Was the United States on a Fiat Standard? 
The previous  section  showed  that  the essential thing  about a  fiat 
reserve country is that its nominal money stock is independent  of interna- 
tional reserve flows. That is a statement about the behavior of its central 
4. See, for example, Heller (1976,1979) and the papers in Meiselman and Laffer (1975) 
and Parkin and Zis (1976a, b). 
5.  In the real world, nonreserve countries may also hold reserves as gold, SDRs, and 
IMF reserve position, but as indicated by Heller  (1979, p. 236) the dominant source of 
variation in reserve growth is in fact variations in holdings of  foreign exchange (and its 
valuation  after  1971). Heller’s  evidence that changes  in  reserves  have  a small lagged 
coefficient in explaining changes in money and ultimately prices (particularly for industrial- 
ized countries) is consistent with the complete contemporaneous sterilization and lagged 
response which figured so prominently in parts I1 and 111  of  this volume; in that case a 
stimulative American monetary policy results in exaggerated reserve flows as detailed in 
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bank-to  be specific, the behavior of the Federal Reserve System. For 
present purposes, convertibility between money and gold, or between 
money and milk, is an entirely separate relative price program so long as 
the Fed  does not adjust  its monetary  policy  to maintain  the pegged 
exchange rate between the dollar and the commodity, whether gold or 
milk. The question at the head of this section can thus be restated as: Did 
gold flows or the balance of  payments enter as a significant variable in the 
reaction function describing the Fed’s monetary policy? 
The Federal Reserve Act required the Fed to hold gold certificates 
issued by the Treasury as reserves against Federal Reserve Notes and the 
Fed’s deposit liabilities, the required reserve ratios being 40 and 35% 
respectively. After the gold price was raised from $20.67 to $35.00 per 
ounce in 1933-34,  the Fed pursued a policy of  partial if not total steriliza- 
tion so that free gold holdings rose dramatically.6  Monetization of  World 
War I1 deficits reduced the free gold holdings, but  Congress in  1945 
reduced the gold reserve requirements on Federal Reserve Notes and 
deposits to 25% each when it appeared that they might impose a real limit 
on the Fed’s monetary policy. Then beginning around the mid-1950~- 
about the time the GNP deflator rose significantly above its devaluation- 
adjusted 1929 level-total  and free gold holdings began a steady decline. 
In March 1965, the reserve requirement against Fed deposits was elimi- 
nated, again lest monetary policy be constrained by  a shortage of  free 
gold. On 17 March 1968, the United States stopped  sales and purchases of 
gold at $35.00 per ounce with everyone except other central banks who 
agreed to trade gold only among themselves thus eliminating the pegged 
dollar price of  gold for private firms and individuals. The next day the 
final reserve requirement against Federal Reserve Notes was eliminated. 
Finally, on 15 August 1971, the United States suspended convertibility of 
dollars into gold even for foreign central banks. 
This thumbnail sketch certainly at least raises the possibility that the 
ties of  the dollar to gold had no real effect on monetary policy, but were 
merely so much political window dressing to be disposed of  whenever 
burdensome.  To proceed further, we need to work with an empirical 
specification of  the Fed’s reaction function. The reaction function (R4) 
contained in the Mark I11 International Transmission Model is a logical 
starting point.  It is reproduced  here for convenience using simplified 
notation:’ 
6. Free gold is the excess of the Fed’s holdings of  gold certificates over the required 
amount. Sterilization is discussed in detail in chapter 10. 
7. See chapters  5 and 6 above for a discussion of this model. The standard errors appear 
below the estimated coefficients, and the t statistics are below the standard errors; Durbin’s 
h cannot be computed in this case. Note that 4A log M = TM  for one-quarter observations. 482  Chapter Sixteen 
(16.6) 
A log M = 0.004 + 0.00025t 
(0.003)  (0.00005) 
1.59  5.06 
+ 0.004 g + 0.002(&1  + g-2) + O.O29(&3  + g-4) 
(0.029)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
(0.090)  (0.100) 
0.14  0.08  1.46 
-  O.O58(lOg P-1 -  log P-3) -  0.237(10g P-3 -  log P-5) 
-  0.64  -2.38 
-  0.117~-  1 + 0.539~~2  -0.432~~3  -0.OS5U-4 
(0.193)  (0.363)  (0.367)  (0.195) 
-  0.60  1.49  -  1.18  -  0.28 
+ 0.461A log M-1 -  0.230A log M-2, 
(0.12)  (0.12) 
3.98  -  1.98 
R2  = 0.56,  S.E.E.  = 0.0046,  D-W = 2.05, 
where  M  is nominal money, t  a time index, g the innovation in real 
government spending, P the price level, and u the unemployment rate; a 
negative subscript indicates the number of quarters a variable is lagged. 
This reaction function allows the Fed to  respond to unanticipated changes 
in government spending, inflation, and unemployment. 
To the basic functional form (16.6), we add three scaled balance-of- 
payments terms such as those included in the nonreserve reaction func- 
tions in the Mark I11 Model* and obtain 
(16.7) 
A log  = r]l + r]2t + r]3g -k  r]4@  1 +  g-2) 
+ I-dg-3 + g-4) + %(log P-1 -  1%  P-3) 
+ r]7(log P-3 -  log  p-S)  +  qSu-l  + %u-2 +  r)lOU-3 
+  r]1lU-4  + r]lzA log M-l  + q13A log  M-2 
+ q14(B/Y)DUMMY + ~~~[(B/Y)-~  + (B/Y)-,]DUMMY 
+ ~)16[(B/Y).-3  + (B/Y)-,]DUMMY  + E, 
where (BIY)  is the balance of payments (surplus positive) as a ratio to 
nominal GNP. The DUMMY variable is included to allow for the possi- 
bility that the Fed was concerned about the balance of  payments only 
until private gold sales and gold reserve requirements were eliminated or, 
alternatively,  only  until  convertibility  was  suspended  in  1971; this  is 
detailed below  but  can be ignored for the moment. The fiat-reserve- 
8.  At least some of  these terms were significantly positive in the nonreserve reaction 
functions reported in chapter 6. 483  The United States as an Exogenous Source of  World Inflation 
country  hypothesis  implies  that  q14 = qlS  = r)16 = 0;  the  alternative 
hypothesis is that the balance-of-payments  effect is positive. 
It  is  unclear  exactly  what  concept  of the  balance  of  payments  is 
appropriate, so we tried three: (a)  the change in gold certificates held by 
the Fed and thus available to satisfy reserve requirements, (b)  the change 
in the total gold stock including intervention account balance, and (c) the 
balance of payments on the official reserve transaction basis. The gold 
stock data are described in an appendix to this chapter. We also tried 
three variants of  the DUMMY variable as  well: one with value 1  through 
19681 and 0 thereafter,  a  second with  value  1 through 19711 and 0 
thereafter, and a third with value 1  throughout. Whatever the period or 
balance-of-payments definition, the results were qualitatively the same as 
summarized  in  table  16.1:  One  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that 
qI4  = qIs  =  q16 = 0 or, alternatively, that q14 = 0 in favor of the alterna- 
tive hypothesis that the balance of  payments has apositive effect. Indeed, 
in the sample period the partial correlation was if  anything negative. 
Inclusion  of  the (BIY) terms had no significant  effect  on the other 
coefficients in the basic equation. These results correspond to the fact 
that the residuals  of  the basic reaction  function  (16.6)  displayed  no 
pattern of significant correlation with the residuals of  any of  the other 
behavioral equations in the Mark I11 Model as reported at the end of 
section 6.2. 
An original working hypothesis of the International  Transmission Pro- 
ject was that, contrary to popular opinion, the gold reserve requirement 
Table 16.1  Tests for Significance of Balance-of-Payments  Variables 
in American Money Reaction Function (16.7) 
t Statistic for  F Statistic 
Balance-of-Payments  Period of  Current (B/Y)  for All (BIY) 
Definition  Effect'  Coefficient  Coefficients8 
Scaled change in gold  19571-681 
certificates  19571-7111 
19571-761V 
Scaled change in total  19571-681 
U.S. gold stock  19571-71 I1 
19571-76IV 
Scaled official reserve  19571-681 
transactions balance  19571-7111 
19571-76IV 
-1.356  0.742 
-1.198  1.133 
-  1.758  1.732 
-  1.319  0.928 
-1.172  1.662 
-  1.818  2.363 
-  0.892  1.463 
-  1.356  0.661 
-  1.982  1.538 
'The  period of  effect indicates the period for which the variable DUMMY in equation 
(16.7) has the value 1; otherwise DUMMY = 0. All regressions are estimated over the 
period  19571-76IV  using the  principal  components 2SLS technique and instrument  list 
described in chapter 6 above. 
§The 5% significance level of  F(3/64) is 2.75. 484  Chapter Sixteen 
had been a significant constraint on U.S. monetary policy in the 1950s  and 
in the 1960s until sometime around the Vietnam War, when a behavioral 
shift occurred and inflation got started. Extensive experimentation with 
alternative forms of the American money reaction function, some  includ- 
ing various measures of  the magnitude  of  the Vietnam  War, yielded 
results similar to table 16.1. This ultimately forced us to conclude that 
such a position could not be supported by the data and that throughout 
the period the Fed behaved as if  on a purely fiat standard. 
The evidence thus indicates that the evolution of  the American nomi- 
nal money supply in the postwar period has not been significantly affected 
by international factors. Two caveats must be entered however: (1) The 
time trend is very powerful, accounting for an increase in steady-state 
money growth from 0.2% per annum at the end of  1956 to 6.0% per 
annum at the end of  1976.9  A multitude of slowly changing factors, some 
perhaps international, may be proxied by r. (2) Foreign factors may have 
affected the U.S. inflation and unemployment rates and hence indirectly 
nominal money growth. Note, however, that unemployment effects are 
self-reversing and a factor increasing inflation would, with a lag, induce a 
partially  offsetting  decrease in  nominal money growth.'O Further, the 
simulated behavior of  the American variables was nearly identical in the 
U.S. money-shock experiments reported in section 7.2 despite widely 
different responses in the nonreserve countries under pegged and floating 
exchange rates. Similarly the simulated effects on American  nominal 
money of  the oil-price shock was minimal-cumulating to about -1% 
over seven quarters as reported in chapter 8. 
16.3  Have International Factors Significantly Affected 
Trends in American Real Money Demand? 
There is no question but that foreign developments have had a statisti- 
cally significant effect on the real quantity of  money demanded in the 
United States: Real export shocks have a statistically significant effect on 
both real income and nominal interest rates, the major determinants of 
money demand, and real American exports depend on foreign income 
and the real price of oil." The level of real income may be significantly 
reduced by increases in the real price of  oil, but the evidence on this 
9.  This steady-state growth assumes that all variables equal their expected values: g = 
g_,=g_,=g_,=g-,=O,logP_,-logP_3=logM~,-logM_3-~p,logP_3- 
log P-,  = log M-3 - log K5  - '/z p, u-I  = u_~  = u-~  = u-., = &, where pis  the 
steady-state  growth  rate  of  real  money  (see  section  16.3) and &,  the  natural  rate of 
unemployment,  is 0.0475 in  1956 and 0.0575 in 1976. The precise values of  the natural 
unemployment rate are not important to these calculations, and the 4% and 5V4%  figures are 
my approximations of  the mean estimates in the literature. 
10. That is, the sum of  the coefficients of the u is  -0.065  and the sum of  the implied 
coefficients for a quarterly change in the price level is  -0.590. 
11. See tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.9, and 6.10 above in chapter 6. 485  The United States as an Exogenous Source of  World Inflation 
is mixed.'* The question addressed here is whether these effects have 
been quantitatively significant as determinants of American inflationary 
trends. 
Both international and domestic factors can have either permanent or 
transitory effects on real money demand. Transitory effects are those 
which are temporary and self-reversing, such as the increase in  real 
money  demand  associated  with  an  unexpected  increase  in  nominal 
money supply or with any other factor which temporarily increases real 
income, lowers nominal interest rates, or both. Permanent factors per- 
manently shift the growth path of money demand up or down; examples 
would be the introduction of a money substitute or a permanent decrease 
in real income due to a permanent adverse shift in the terms of  trade 
(OPEC)  .I3 By their very self-reversing nature, transitory money demand 
effects play practically no role in explaining inflationary trends while 
permanent  shifts average out in  their  effects on  inflationary trends, 
although not on the price 1e~el.I~ 
In this section we address the empirical question of how important are 
factors other than  nominal  money  growth in  determining  American 
inflation. The answer should differ with the length of period over which 
we  are measuring  the inflation rate  for reasons  outlined  above and 
discussed at length in chapter 15: The longer the period of observation, 
the less important will be nonmonetary factors as determinants of  infla- 
tion.  A  simple but  robust  measure can  be  obtained by  running the 
following regression: 
(16.8) 
where  is  the j-quarter  growth  rate  operator [qX=  4(log X  -  log 
X-,)/j],  p is the trend annual growth rate in the real quantity of  money 
demanded, and the disturbance v represents the effect on inflation of all 
nonmonetary factors. The four-year distributed lag on money growth 
appears sufficient from the previous work of  others to allow for most of 
the effects of  variations in nominal money growth on the growth rate of 
12.  See chapter 8. 
13. See, for example, the discussions in chapters 14 and 8. 
14. That is, the evolution of  real money demand can be described by 
4 
,=1  Alogm,=~~+~,-  Z  O,er-;, 
where p  is the trend growth rate of  real money demanded rn and E,  is white noise process. 
The permanent effect of  the factors represented by  c,  is 
If the moving average terms (the Oi)  sum to 1, then all factors affecting money demand are 
transitory and the disturbance u, in log m, = log rno + kt + U, is stationary. See chapter 15 
for a detailed analysis of this problem as applied to purchasing power ratios. 486  Chapter Sixteen 
real money demand.15  Regressions of the form (16.8) were estimated for 
j = 1,4,  8, and 16 using American nominal money (MI)  data for 1954IV 
through  1978IV.I6 The results are reported in table 16.2. We see that 
while nominal money growth explains most of the variance of the infla- 
tion rate for quarterly observations, nonmonetary factors are also im- 
portant (and serially correlated). For annual or biennial observations, 
however, the standard error drops to 1.2% per annum and the serial 
correlation largely disappears. Looking at longer-run trends as evidenced 
by quadrennial  observations, money growth explains 97% of the variance 
of  the inflation rate with the remaining standard error of estimate only 
0.4% per annum. These results indicate that (domestic and international) 
nonmonetary factors affecting real money demand may play a substantial 
role in short-run inflationary developments, but long-run inflation trends 
are dominated by movements in the average growth rate of  the nominal 
quantity of money supplied.  l7 These results complement the more formal 
statistical analyses of previous chapters by placing an upper bound on the 
potential influence of  all factors other than nominal money supply as 
determinants of  American inflation. 
16.4  Conclusions and Implications 
The empirical results in section 16.2 demonstrated that the Federal 
Reserve System did not display any significant response to the balance of 
payments  or gold flows in  determining the American  money supply. 
Indeed the point estimates of the response generally had the wrong sign 
for our sample period. We conclude that the United States was de facto 
on a fiat standard from 1957 through the present, even in those years in 
which the price of gold was being pegged at $35 per ounce. 
15. Note that there are sixteen lag terms when; = 1 and only one lag term when;  = 16. 
This is obviously not a model which will maximize the explanatory power of no_minal  money 
growth for the inflation rate, but should provide a good lower bound for the R2  and upper 
bound  for the standard error of  estimate.  Except for the  quadrennial  regressions,  the 
contemporaneous money growth  (i-=  0)  term was insignificant; so reverse causation does 
not appear to inflate the reported R2  values. 
16. This was the longest post-Accord period available for all the regressions at the time 
the regressions were run. 
17. Similar, albeit not quite as strong, results are obtained using high-powered money H 
(currency held by the public + reserves) or M2  (M, + time deposits at commercial banks 
excluding large negotiable CDs): 
Observation Length  Rz  for H  R2  for M2 
'/4 year  0.5053  0.6600 
1 year  0.6550  0.7770 
2 years  0.6912  0.7783 
4 years  0.9348  0.8596 
Apparently for short observation lengths, variations in moncy-multiplier growth adversely 
affect the predictive  power of  H  while for longer observation lengths, variations in the 
growth of  time deposits do the same for M2. 487  The United States as an Exogenous Source of  World Inflation 
Table 16.2  Summary Statistics for Prediction of Inflation Rate by 
Observation 
Length  S.E.E.  x2  D-W 
?A year  (j= 1)  0.0165  0.6264  1  .OO 
1 year (j=4)  0.0119  0.7802  1.48 
2 years (j=  8)  0.0121  0.7586  1.74 
4 years (j=  16)  0.0040  0.9699  2.83 
Note. P is the GNP deflator; M is the MI  (currency + demand deposits) money stock; all 
regressions are run for 1959:l through  1978:4 on data from 1954:4 through 1978:4. 
Section 16.1  had shown that a fiat reserve country would autonomously 
determine world inflationary trends unless foreign factors had a signifi- 
cant effect on the growth rate of the real quantity of money demanded in 
the reserve country. So section 16.3  examined the extent that fluctuations 
in  U.S. real money demand other than those explained  by time and 
nominal money growth affected the rate of inflation. These nonmonetary 
factors played  an important supporting role in determining short-run 
variations in the inflation rate, but were negligible for inflationary trends 
over a period of  four years. 
This chapter illuminates the meaning of some of the earlier results in 
this volume: There is plenty of  room for significant effects of  foreign 
variables estimated earlier to play an important role in determining the 
inflation rate in any particular quarter or year. But because the induced 
shifts in the real quantity of money demanded are in part temporary and 
otherwise average out over longer periods of time, United States  inflation 
was a very nearly independent or exogenous source of  trends in world 
inflation under the Bretton Woods system. Foreign influences had no 
significant effect on the evolution of American monetary policy, and that 
was very  nearly  the only factor  determining  the trends in  American 
inflation. 
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Appendix 
Two alternative series for the American gold stock were compiled. The 
first of these is the Treasury gold stock at the end of  the quarter. This 
concept, listed in table 16.3,  is the value of  the gold certificates issued by 
the Treasury and held by the Federal Reserve System. It excludes the 
intervention-transactions  holdings of  the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
even though those holdings could be converted into gold certificates by 
the stroke of  a bookkeeper’s pen as was done for $1  billion of  gold in the 
first quarter of 1970. Thus the second concept, the total gold stock of  the 
U.S. monetary authorities, adds the Exchange Stabilization Fund hold- 
Table 16.3  United States Treasury Gold Stock, End of Quarter 
Official Values in Billions of Dollars 
Quarter 
Year  1  2  3  4 
1954  ...  ...  ...  21.7125 
1955  21.7192  21.6776  21.6837  21.6904 
1956  21.7157  21.7991  21.8843  21.9495 
1957  22.3058  22.6229  22.6355  22.7810 
1958  22.3941  21.3562  20.8735  20.5343 
1959  20.4417  19.7046  19.4907  19.4559 
1960  19.4078  19.3222  18.6846  17.7666 
1961  17.3882  17.5502  17.3760  16.8890 
1962  16.6084  16.4352  16.0674  15.9781 
1963  15.8775  15.7333  15.5816  15.5130 
1964  15.4607  15.4617  15.4631  15.3877 
1965  14.5635  13.9341  13.8576  13.7332 
1966  13.6335  13.4335  13.2583  13.1591 
1967  13.1074  13.1097  13.0061  11.9816 
1968  10.4840  10.3669  10.367  10.367 
1969  10.367  10.367  10.367  10.367 
1970  11.367  11.367  11.117  10.732 
1971  10.732  10.332  10.132  10.132 
1972  9.588  10.410  10.410  10.410 
1973  10.410  10.410  10.410  11.567 
1974  11.567  11.567  11.567  11.652 
1975  11.620  11.620  11.599  11.599 
1976  11.599  11.598  11.598  11.598 
Sources. “Gold Assets and Liabilities of  the Treasury,” in the Treasury Bulletin, December 
issues, 1955-76, and January 1979. 
Note. Increase in 1972:2  and 1973:4 are due to devaluations only. Increase in 1970:l is due 
to a $1 billion transfer from the Exchange Stabilization Fund. Gold is priced at $35 per 
ounce through 1972:1, $38 per ounce from 1972:2 through 1973:3, and $42.22 thereafter. 489  The United States as an Exogenous Source of  World Inflation 
Table 16.4  United States Total Gold Stock, 
Including Exchange Stabilization Fund, 
End of Quarter Official Values in Billions of Dollars 
Quarter 
Year  1  2  3  4 
1954  ...  ...  ...  21.793 
1955  21.763  21.730  21.745  21.753 
1956  21.765  21.868  21.032  22.058 
1957  22.406  22.732  22.759  22.857 
1958  22.487  21.412  20.929  20.582 
1959  20.486  19.746  19.579  19.507 
1960  19.457  19.363  18.725  17.804 
1961  17.433  17.603  17.457  16.947 
1962  16.643  16.527  16.081  16.057 
1963  15.946  15.830  15.634  15.596 
1964  15.550  15.623  15.643  15.471 
1965  14.639  14.049  13.925  13.806 
1966  13.738  13.529  13.356  13.235 
1967  13.184  13.169  13.077  12.065 
1968  10.703  10.681  10.755  10.892 
1969  10.836  11.153  11.164  11.859 
1970  11.903  11.889  11.494  11.072 
1971  10.963  10.507  10.207  10.206 
1972  9.662  10.490  10.487  10.487 
1973  10.487  10.487  10.487  11.652 
1974  11.652  11.652  11.652  11.652 
1975  11.620  11.620  11.599  11.599 
1976  11.599  11.598  11.598  11.598 
Sources. Tables (variously titled “Analysis of Changes in U.S. Gold Stock . . .” and “US 
Gold Stock Holdings . . .”) in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, January issues, 1956-77. 
Note. Increase in 1972:2  and 1973:4 are due to devaluations only. 
ings to the first concept (see table 16.4). Both series are affected by 
devaluations from $35 to $38 per ounce in 197211 and from $38 to $42.22 
in 1973IV, but these took place after the end of convertibility of the dollar 
into gold. 490  Chapter Sixteen 
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